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EVIDENCE
I. LEADING QUESTIONS PERMITTED DURING DIRECT
EXAMINATION OF CHILD WITNESS
In State v. Hale1 the South Carolina Court of Appeals rec-
ognized the validity of the use of leading questions during direct
examination of a child witness. The court also recognized the
effectiveness of a curative instruction given to a jury after the
prosecution commented on the postarrest silence of the
defendant.
Hale was convicted of two counts of first degree criminal
conduct and two counts of committing a lewd act upon a child.2
His convictions were affirmed. On appeal Hale urged a number
of grounds for reversal. He first contended that the trial judge
erred in allowing the prosecution, over continuing objection, to
ask leading questions of two witnesses who were eight and nine
years old. The court rejected this contention, observing that a
trial judge is vested with wide discretion in ruling on an objec-
tion that a question is leading3 and that reversal on the grounds
of abuse of such discretion is rare." The court further noted that
leading questions may be asked of a child witness, particularly
when matters of a sexual nature are involved.5
The reasoning of the court on this issue is well considered
and timely. The use of children as witnesses is generally recog-
nized as necessitating a different method of questioning from
that used for adults.' In the context of sexually oriented cases,
the problems of the child witness are even more pronounced. As
of May 1985, eleven states had passed legislation adopting spe-
cial hearsay exceptions for a child's out-of-court statement re-
1. 284 S.C. 348, 326 S.E.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1985).
2. Id. at 350-51, 326 S.E.2d at 420; see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-652, 16-15-140 (1976).
3. 284 S.C. at 351, 326 S.E.2d at 420 (citing State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 268
S.E.2d 31, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1037 (1980)).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See generally Perry & Teply, Interviewing, Counseling, and In-Court Examina-
tion of Children: Practical Approaches for Attorneys, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1369 (1985).
1
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garding sexual abuse.7 Even more states allow for the videotap-
ing of a child's testimony.8 Therefore, by accepting the use of
leading questions when addressing children, the court of appeals
recognized one of the numerous methods that have been ap-
proved in coping with the special problems posed by the child
witness.
Hale also argued that the lower court erred in not granting a
mistrial after the solicitor commented on the defendant's post-
arrest silence." Rather than grant a mistrial, the trial judge im-
mediately gave the jury a curative instruction that they were not
to consider the defendant's silence in their deliberations.10 The
court of appeals held that in the circumstances of this case, the
curative instruction was adequate to cure any potential
prejudice to Hale."' Since curative instructions are commonly
used and upheld in South Carolina, the court's decision is con-
sistent with previous South Carolina law.1 2 Thus, Hale should
alert the practitioner to object quickly to any line of questioning
or attempted introduction of evidence that appears to be im-
proper since a curative instruction will probably preclude any
7. See Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other
Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REv. 645, 650 (1985).
8. Id. at 666.
9. The comment arose during the cross-examination of Hale by the solicitor. The
following dialogue took place after Hale testified that he had been arrested and taken to
the county jail:
Q. And you didn't tell any police officer anything about this charge; did
you?
A. They asked me whether I wanted to make a statement, and I said that I
did not until after I had seen an attorney.
Q. And you never did; did you?
A. No, I did not.
Q. You never told anybody until today, you never told any police officer
until today that-
284 S.C. at 354, 326 S.E.2d at 421-22. The defense counsel immediately objected to this
line of questioning. Id.
10. The instruction read as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, a few minutes ago the question was asked about
this defendant making a statement, and an objection was made. The objection
was sustained, and I instruct you that you are to give that no consideration
whatsoever, to the question and any answer. I have ruled that that question
and the answer, if there was one, is inadmissible.
284 S.C. at 354, 326 S.E.2d at 422.
11. Id. at 355, 326 S.E.2d at 422.
12. See State v. Craig, 267 S.C. 262, 227 S.E.2d 306 (1976); State v. Campbell, 259
S.C. 339, 191 S.E.2d 770 (1972).
2
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chance of reversal on appeal.
Alec Bramlett
II. TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ACTS OF BAD FAITH IS
ADMISSIBLE
In United States v. Smith Grading and Paving, Inc.13 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals examined a direct conflict be-
tween rules 404(b) 14 and 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. The court held that rule 404(b) controlled and, conse-
quently, affirmed as proper the trial court's decision to allow the
prosecution to admit testimony of the defendant's prior acts of
bad faith in rebuttal to the defendant's denial of the acts during
cross-examination.
16
The criminal proceeding consisted of a six-count indictment
against two corporate defendants and the individuals responsi-
ble for the company's bid on a sewer project funded by the
Farmer's Home Administration. The government alleged a viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act 17 and contended that the
13. 760 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Dellinger, Inc. v. United
States, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 524 (1985).
14. Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the charac-
ter of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
15. Rule 608(b) provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the dis-
cretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired
into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truth-
fulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being
cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness,
does not operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when
examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
16. 760 F.2d at 531.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
3
Bramlett and Simmons: Evidence
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
defendants conspired to rig bids on the project. During cross-
examination, one of the individual defendants denied bid-rigging
on a project not included in the indictment. The trial court then
allowed the prosecution to introduce testimony by a rebuttal
witness implicating the defendant in the earlier scheme.'
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the defendants claimed the
admission of the prior bid-rigging evidence constituted a viola-
tion of rule 608(b), while the government contended the testi-
mony was admissible pursuant to rule 404(b). Initially, the court
recognized the applicability of both rules to the situation. 9 Rule
608(b) would have rendered the testimony inadmissible because
the testimony was extrinsic evidence attacking the defendant's
credibility. The testimony would be admissible under rule
404(b) because it was relevant to the defendant's intent and
knowledge and was found to be more probative than prejudical.
Confronted squarely with the inherent conflict between the two
rules, the court held that the goals and purposes of the rules of
evidence would be better served by giving rule 404(b) priority.20
Thus, the court rejected the defendant's argument.
21
The court, however, sought to limit the consequence of its
holding, recognizing the potential impact of allowing the prose-
cution to submit evidence of other wrongs through rebuttal tes-
timony. The court firmly stated that rule 404(b) evidence gener-
ally should be included in the government's case-in-chief and
warned that the burden of inclusion may be greater when the
testimony is offered on cross-examination or rebuttal and if the
evidence was cumulative or necessary to prove an essential ele-
ment of the crime charged.22 Furthermore, the court viewed rule
611(b) 23 as an additional safeguard because it allows a defendant
to object when the cross-examination exceeds the scope of the
direct examination.
24
Despite the strict warnings by the court, the impact of
Smith Grading and Paving cannot be minimized. Admission of
evidence of other wrongs, even when accompanied with instruc-
18. 760 F.2d at 530.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 531.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. FED. R. EVID. 611(b).
24. 760 F.2d at 531.
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tions to the jury, greatly increases the risk of conviction because
jurors may determine the defendant to be a person of poor char-
acter. Another risk is that the jury may convict based on the
impression that since the defendant participated in a similar
crime, he must also have been involved in the crime in question.
These notions are further complicated when the government is
allowed the final say through rebuttal testimony.
The Fourth Circuit found that its ruling was consonant with
the decisions of the majority of federal circuit courts of appeal
that have addressed the conflict.25 Despite this consensus, a
close examination of rule 404(b) illustrates that impeachment is
not one of the purposes of the section. This is the result, how-
ever, when the government is allowed to utilize rebuttal testi-
mony after the defendant has denied his involvement on cross-
examination.
Smith Grading and Paving may be far-reaching despite the
court's guidelines. Many courts, in determining whether to ad-
mit evidence of uncharged crimes under rule 404(b), have re-
quired the prosecution to present "clear and convincing" evi-
dence of the prior act.26 This burden was not recognized by the
Fourth Circuit, but is probably warranted given the inherent
difficulties with admitting such evidence during rebuttal
testimony.
John S. Simmons
25. Id. at 530 (citing United States v. Jacobson, 578 F.2d 863 (10th Cir. 1978));
United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978); United States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219 (5th
Cir. 1977).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Wilford, 710 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Wormick, 709 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1983); Manning v. Rose, 507 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1974).
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